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Cultural Communities in a Global Labor
Market: Immigration Restrictions as
Residential Segregation
Howard F. Changt
When economists speak of a globalizing world, they have in
mind first and foremost the dramatic moves we have made to-
ward a global common market; that is, our evolution toward a
world economy integrated across national boundaries. Our pro-
gress in this direction has been especially dramatic in the liber-
alization of international trade in goods. Since multilateral trade
negotiations produced the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT")' in 1947, subsequent rounds of negotiations have
steadily reduced trade barriers among states.
Economists generally welcome this development, prescribing
free trade as the regime that maximizes global economic welfare.
Economists also recommend liberalized trade as a policy that is
likely to produce gains for each national economy. Gains from
trade arise because different countries will produce goods at dif-
ferent costs. When countries restrict trade, the price of a good
will be low in countries that can produce it at low cost but high in
countries that can only produce it at high cost. Liberalized trade
allows both countries to gain. The high-price country can gain by
importing the good at a lower price than it would cost to produce
it at home, while the low-price country can gain by exporting the
good at a higher price than it would fetch at home.
Economists also recognize that the same theory that applies
to goods also applies to international trade in other markets. Na-
t Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Copy-
right C 2007 by Howard F. Chang. I would like to thank Matthew Lister, Gideon Par-
chomovsky, Stephen Perry, conference participants at the University of Chicago, Wash-
ington University, the University of Pennsylvania, Tulane University, Sacramento State
University, and the 2005 meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, and
seminar participants at Stanford University, Georgetown University, and the University
of Akron for helpful comments.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct 30, 1947, 61 Stat pt 5, TIAS No
1700.
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tions can gain through not only the free movement of goods
across national boundaries but also the free movement of ser-
vices, capital, and labor across national boundaries. In particu-
lar, consider the economic effects of labor migration in world la-
bor markets. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage
countries to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a
result of this migration, world output rises. Higher wages in the
host country imply that the marginal product of labor is higher
there than in the source country. That is, higher wages for the
same worker mean that the worker produces more value in the
host country than in the source country. Because labor flows to
the country where it has the higher-value use, labor migration
generally leads to net gains in wealth for the world as a whole. 2
An efficient global labor market would allow labor to move freely
to the country where it earns the highest return. Market forces
would thus direct labor to the market where its marginal product
is highest. For this reason, economic theory raises a presumption
in favor of the free movement of labor.
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor in-
ternationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of
labor to diverge widely among different countries. 3 For any given
class of labor, high-wage countries could gain by employing more
immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain
by selling more of their labor to employers in high-wage coun-
tries. 4 Immigration restrictions distort the global labor market,
producing a misallocation of labor among countries, thereby
wasting human resources and creating unnecessary poverty in
labor-abundant countries. The larger the inequality in wages
between countries, the larger the distortion of global labor mar-
kets caused by migration restrictions, and the larger the eco-
nomic gains from liberalizing labor migration. Given the large
international differences in wages, it should be apparent that the
potential gains from liberalized labor migration-and the costs
that the world bears as a result of immigration barriers-are
huge.
2 See Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and
Policy 158-59 (Harper Collins 2d ed 1991).
3 See Mexican Deportees Report Good Treatment, UPI (Apr 21, 1996), (reporting that
Mexican immigrants received an average of $278 per week in the United States, com-
pared with $30.81 per week in Mexico).
4 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U Pa L Rev 1147, 1149 (1997).
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In fact, some economists have attempted to estimate the
gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing migration. These
studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from remov-
ing migration barriers could well be enormous and would now
greatly exceed the gains from removing trade barriers. Bob Ham-
ilton and John Whalley, for example, provide estimates that sug-
gest that the gains from the free migration of labor could more
than double worldwide real income. 5 Their analysis also indi-
cates that the free migration of labor would greatly improve the
global distribution of income by raising real wages dramatically
for the world's poorest workers. 6 Despite the presumption that
economic theory raises in favor of international labor mobility,
the nations of the world maintain restrictions on immigration
and show little inclination to liberalize these barriers signifi-
cantly. As Kitty Calavita has observed, "the irony is that in this
period of globalization marked by its free movement of capital
and goods, the movement of labor is subject to greater restric-
tions than at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution."7
To some degree, however, globalization proceeds in the labor
market despite the immigration barriers that states raise. In the
United States, for example, there are probably over ten million
unauthorized immigrants residing among us today, accounting
for over 3 percent of the total U.S. population, with seven-
hundred thousand more unauthorized immigrants arriving each
5 See Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14 J Dev Econ 61, 70 (1984). This early study
used data from 1977. See id at 67. A recent study applying the same assumptions to 1998
data produced similar results, finding that "the estimated efficiency gains from liberaliz-
ing immigration controls have only increased over time." Jonathon W. Moses and Bjorn
Letnes, The Economic Costs to International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical
Discussion, 32 World Dev 1609, 1610 (2004). The authors attribute the increase in esti-
mated efficiency gains to the increase in "wage .. .inequalities over the past 20 years." Id
at 1619. For a survey of the empirical evidence regarding the economic effects of immigra-
tion restrictions, see Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of International Labor
Migration: Recent Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 Temple Polit & Civ Rts L Rev
(forthcoming 2007).
6 See Hamilton and Whalley, 14 J Dev Econ at 69, 73-74 (cited in note 5) (providing
estimates of wage increases in less developed countries ranging from 374 to 1718 per-
cent); Moses and Letnes, 32 World Dev at 1620 (cited in note 5) (suggesting that "interna-
tional migration may be one of the most effective means of shrinking the income gap that
separates rich and poor countries"). Kevin O'Rourke provides empirical evidence that
international migration in the late 19th century was quite effective in raising living stan-
dards in poor countries. See Kevin H. O'Rourke, The Era of Free Migration: Lessons for
Today (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi Legal F).
7 Kitty Calavita, U.S. Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the
Future, 2 Ind J Global Legal Stud 143, 152 (1994).
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year.8 Thus, the global labor market resists attempts by states to
restrict the flow of labor across borders.
Most unauthorized immigrants in the United States come
from Mexico, 9 where workers earn one-ninth what they can earn
in the United States. 10 Given the disparity in wages between
these labor markets and the tight restrictions on the legal entry
of workers, the incentives for illegal immigration are enormous.
Indeed, in recent years, hundreds of unauthorized immigrants
have died each year attempting to enter the United States from
Mexico under dangerous conditions, and these deaths have given
a sense of urgency to the campaign for liberalized immigration
laws."1
Efforts to liberalize the restrictions on the flow of workers
into the United States have picked up momentum recently as
President George Bush has proposed an expanded guest-worker
program that would allow unauthorized immigrants to legalize
their status as guest workers. 12 The Senate passed a bill in 2006
that would establish such a guest-worker program and also ex-
pand opportunities for legal immigration and permanent resi-
dence, gathering broad bipartisan support and embracing a top
8 See Jeffrey S. Passel, Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics 6 (Pew
Hispanic Center, June 14, 2005), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf>
(last visited Jan 20, 2007) (reporting estimated population numbers and characteristics of
the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States in 2005). The Census Bu-
reau estimates that the total population of the United States reached 300 million in Octo-
ber 2006. See Sam Roberts, A 300 Millionth American. Don't Ask Who, NY Times 15 (Oct
18, 2006).
9 Passel, Unauthorized Migrants at 4 (cited in note 8). Thus, 'labor integration be-
tween the United States and Mexico is occurring from the bottom up, with U.S. employers
and Mexican workers moving in this direction," as "[e]fforts to bar the employment of
undocumented workers have been largely ineffective." Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?,
51 UCLA L Rev 193, 243 (2003).
10 See Mexican Deportees Report Good Treatment (cited in note 3) (reporting that the
average wage for a sampling of Mexican deportees was $278 per week in the United
States, compared to $30.81 per week at their previous job in Mexico).
11 See, for example, Senate Committee Conducts Hearing on Immigration Reform
Legislation, 82 Interpreter Releases 1243, 1244 (2005) (comments of Senator John
McCain) (describing the number of immigrants who died while trying to illegally cross the
southern border of the United States); Johnson, 51 UCLA L Rev at 221 (cited in note 9)
("Military-style operations on the Southwest border have channeled immigrants into
remote, desolate locations where thousands have died agonizing deaths from heat, cold,
and thirst.").
12 See, for example, President Bush Announces Immigration Initiative, 81 Interpreter
Releases 33 (2004) (detailing President Bush's immigration proposal); Pres. Bush Renews
Call for a Temporary Worker Program, 82 Interpreter Releases 274 (2005) (reporting that
during his State of the Union address, President Bush asked Congress to cooperate to
enact immigration reform).
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priority for immigrant activists and labor unions. 13 Although the
Republican majority in the House of Representatives failed to
support the Senate bill, the November 2006 elections, which
shifted control of the House to the Democrats, improved the
prospects for liberalized. 14
Nevertheless, countries of immigration generally resist the
extension of the case for free trade to the labor market. Even if
we adopt the maximization of global social welfare as our policy
objective, there may be many reasons to distinguish trade in
goods from trade in the labor market and to take a more restric-
tive approach to the migration of workers than we take to the
movement of goods. This Article, however, will focus on only one
set of objections to the free movement of workers, namely, con-
cerns about the effect of labor mobility on cultural communities.
In particular, I offer a critique of the claims that the com-
munitarian political theorist Michael Walzer makes in defense of
immigration restrictions. Walzer defends the power of "the sov-
ereign state ... to make its own admissions policy, to control and
sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants," because "[t]he dis-
tinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure," and
"most people . . seem to believe" that "this distinctiveness is a
value."'15 Although Walzer expresses common intuitions, I draw
on insights from the economic literature to question his claims:
Must states impose restrictions on immigration in order to en-
sure the "distinctiveness of cultures and groups" in the world? If
people value distinctive cultural communities, then why would
we expect their free movement to undermine those communities?
In Part I of this Article, I begin with a critique from an eco-
nomic perspective. I take the maximization of global economic
welfare to be the objective, then explore whether the value of dis-
tinctive cultural communities can justify immigration restric-
13 See Senate Passes Immigration Bill, Conference Needed to Resolve Senate and
House Differences, 83 Interpreter Releases 1037 (2006) (discussing the similarities and
differences between the different immigration bills passed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives).
14 See Randal C. Archibold, Democratic Victory Raises Spirits of Those Favoring
Citizenship for Illegal Aliens, NY Times 27 (Nov 10, 2006) (describing optimism that
Democratic leadership in both houses of Congress will lead to changes in immigration law
favorable to unauthorized immigrants).
15 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 39 (Basic
Books 1983). Recognizing Walzer's defense of immigration restrictions as one of the most
important and influential in political theory, a leading immigration law casebook includes
an extensive set of excerpts from Walzer's book. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, et al,
Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 225-32 (West 5th ed 2003) (quoting
Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 31-34, 37-40, 45, 47-49, 61-62).
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tions. A focus on global economic welfare, rather than the eco-
nomic welfare of the country of immigration, is more consistent
with the spirit of Walzer's defense of immigration restrictions, as
he argues that immigration restrictions are good for humankind
in general, not merely that they are good for residents of coun-
tries of immigration. 16 This "global" perspective has a "long and
distinguished tradition" in economics and in utilitarianism, 17 and
many have argued that normative analysis requires such a cos-
mopolitan perspective.18 My goal in this Article is not to enter
that debate or to defend the cosmopolitan perspective against its
critics.' 9 Instead, I simply assume that we seek to maximize
global economic welfare, then explore the policy implications of
that normative criterion.
First, I assume that Walzer is right to value the segregation
of people into distinctive cultural communities, but I suggest that
immigration restrictions are not the optimal means for maintain-
ing such communities. I argue that individuals with heterogene-
ous preferences would segregate themselves voluntarily into dis-
tinctive communities. This voluntary segregation would allow
individuals to enjoy gains from trade in the labor market,
whereas immigration restrictions would sacrifice these gains.
16 See, for example, Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15) (claiming that
a world of free movement would be "a world of radically deracinated men and women").
17 Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey
with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in Warren F. Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigration 158,
162 (Cambridge 1995) (noting that both the "global" and "national" perspectives "have a
long and distinguished tradition in the discussion of international economic policy").
18 See, for example, Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Bor-
ders, 49 Rev Pol 251, 263 (1987) (noting that "the utilitarian commitment to moral equal-
ity is reflected in the assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more
than one when utility is calculated," so that "current citizens would enjoy no privileged
position" in a calculation of the welfare effects of immigration policy); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Just Borders: Normative Economics and Immigration Law, in Schwartz, Justice in Immi-
gration at 201, 205 (cited in note 17) (arguing that "[i]f economists are to participate in
the normative debate over immigration ... there can be no starting point other than a
global social welfare function," because only that perspective "avoids the question begging
raised by a national social welfare function"). Following in this tradition, I have argued
elsewhere in favor of a global welfare objective from the standpoint of liberal ideals. See,
for example, Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the
Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 40 Cornell Int'l L J (forth-
coming 2007); Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice,
and Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DePaul L Rev 759, 768-73 (2003).
19 Cosmopolitan political theorists and philosophers have advanced cogent arguments
for theories of global justice that extend equal concern to the interests of all individuals
throughout the world. See, for example, Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and Interna-
tional Relations (Princeton 1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls 240-80 (Cornell
1989); Peter Singer, One World (Yale 2002).
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Next in Part II, I turn to a moral critique from a liberal per-
spective. I argue that even if immigration restrictions satisfy the
preferences of incumbent residents for more extensive or more
stable segregation of cultural communities than voluntary segre-
gation can provide, this effect cannot justify immigration restric-
tions in a society committed to liberal ideals. Just as we condemn
segregation at the local level for undermining equality of oppor-
tunity in the domestic context, I suggest, we should condemn
immigration restrictions for undermining global equality of op-
portunity. Concerns about the cultural effects of immigration in
a liberal state can justify only limited restrictions on immigra-
tion. Finally, I conclude with implications for immigration poli-
cies in liberal states.
I. GLOBAL ECONOMIC WELFARE AND CULTURAL COMMUNITIES
Suppose we assume that our goal is to maximize global eco-
nomic welfare, taking all preferences of all individuals as equally
worthy of satisfaction. I will first draw on economic models of
residential segregation to suggest that individuals are likely to
sort themselves into distinctive cultural communities without
any regulations mandating such segregation. Given the distor-
tions that immigration restrictions introduce in the global labor
market, I question whether we should expect immigration re-
strictions to increase global economic welfare compared to the
alternative of voluntary segregation.
A. Heterogeneous Preferences for Public Goods
We would expect freely mobile individuals with heterogene-
ous preferences to segregate themselves voluntarily into distinc-
tive communities. The economist Charles Tiebout suggested the
classic model of this sorting process, in which individuals prefer
different bundles of local public goods and move to communities
that provide the bundles that they desire. 20 If the set of available
communities spans the full range of bundles desired by these
individuals, the result of free mobility is a Pareto efficient equi-
librium in which each individual resides in a homogeneous com-
munity providing the ideal bundle of local public goods for its
residents. 21
20 See Charles M. Tiebout, The Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ
416 (1956).
21 See id at 421 (noting that if the number of communities is unlimited, and each
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If we think of a community as providing its culture as a local
public good, then why not expect free movement to generate an
equilibrium in which distinctive cultural communities thrive? In
the Tiebout model, far from being a threat to distinctive commu-
nities, free mobility is a necessary condition for the efficient seg-
regation of residents into such communities. 22 Restrictions on
mobility only serve to trap individuals in communities that they
would prefer to leave and to prevent them from joining communi-
ties more closely matching their preferences. Under conditions of
free mobility, people with similar tastes can "vote with their feet"
and thus live together in communities tailored to satisfying their
preferences for public goods, services, policies, and institutions. 23
Those who prefer to have government services delivered in a par-
ticular language, for example, would form communities that can
efficiently provide those services in their own language.
Although the conditions necessary for Pareto efficiency in
the Tiebout model are strong, even under more relaxed assump-
tions, one would expect segregation into distinctive communities.
It should not be surprising that the empirical evidence is consis-
tent with this hypothesis. People in the United States, for exam-
ple, exhibit a high degree of mobility. 24 Studies of major metro-
politan areas in the United States reveal patterns of segregation
in which a diverse population sorts itself into a diverse set of lo-
cal communities with more homogeneous preferences. 25
Walzer recognizes the alternative of segregation at the local
level rather than at the national level. He rejects this alterna-
tive, however, based on two claims. First, he makes the empirical
claim that in order to ensure distinctive communities, the right
to control immigration, or "closure" as he puts it, "must be per-
mitted somewhere," that is, "[a]t some level of political organiza-
tion. '26 Second, he asserts as a normative matter that we should
announces "a different pattern of expenditures on public goods," then "the consumer-voter
will move to that community which exactly satisfies their preferences").
22 Tiebout's first assumption is that each individual is "fully mobile and will move to
that community where their preference patterns ... are best satisfied." Id at 419.
23 Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 529 (Irwin 3d ed 1992).
24 For example, the U.S. Bureau of the Census found that 41.5 million U.S. residents,
or 17 percent of the U.S. population, moved in the year leading to March 1991, and 7
million of those moved between states. See In Search of Security, The Economist 25-26
(Oct 16, 1993). This rate of movement is a "persistent pattern" in the United States.
Rosen, Public Finance at 532 (cited in note 23).
25 For empirical evidence of the Tiebout hypothesis, see Edward M. Gramlich and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of
the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J Polit Econ 536 (1982).
26 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
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prefer such "closure" at the national level rather than the local
level because "individual choice is most dependent upon local
mobility."27 The Tiebout model and the evidence of the Tiebout
process in the real world, however, cast doubt on both of Walzer's
claims.
First, the evidence of voluntary segregation into distinctive
cultural communities within nation-states suggests that the type
of immigration restriction practiced at the national level is not
necessary to produce such communities. As Yael Tamir notes:
Cultural uniqueness is preserved in Quebec, in Belgium,
and in many other places, without an actual geographical
border. Scattered peoples like the Jews or Armenians, and
immigrant groups such as Hispanics in Southern Califor-
nia, Cubans in Miami, Algerians in France, and Paki-
stanis in England, and religious sects like the Mormons in
Utah, the Amish in Pennsylvania, or the ultra-Orthodox
Jewish community in Jerusalem, also manage to preserve
their identity without tangible boundaries. 28
In the United States, we observe cities with large immigrant
populations, in which different ethnic groups readily form their
own communities without any migration regulations mandating
such segregation. As George Borjas notes, "[e]thnic neighbor-
hoods have long been a dominant feature of American cities (and
of cities in many other countries)."29 Using data for the United
States, Borjas documents "substantial residential segregation by
ethnicity."30 We also observe similar patterns of residential seg-
regation in other countries receiving immigrants. 31 This evidence
of voluntary segregation based on ethnicity casts doubt on Wal-
zer's claim that communities need immigration restrictions to
remain distinctive. 32
27 Id.
28 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 166 (Princeton 1993).
29 George J. Borjas, Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human-Capital Externalities, 85
Am Econ Rev 365, 365 (1995).
30 Id at 388. He finds "a strong likelihood that persons belonging to a particular eth-
nic group reside in a neighborhood where a relatively high number of persons share the
same ethnic background." Id. For example, "the average Mexican lived in a neighborhood
that was 50.3 percent Mexican." Id at 371.
31 See, for example, Philip Johnston, Whites "Leaving Cities as Migrants Move In,"
Daily Telegraph 1 (London) (Feb 10, 2005) (discussing reports that "[wihite and ethnic
minority populations are becoming increasingly separated" in urban areas of the United
Kingdom as a result of "growing levels of population movement and immigration").
32 See Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigra-
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Second, the Tiebout model suggests that we should prefer
residential segregation at the local level. Residential segregation
at the local level allows individuals to enjoy the benefits of living
in a community matching their preferences while still enjoying
access to labor markets in other communities nearby. One condi-
tion for the Tiebout efficiency result is that individuals can
choose their communities without sacrificing access to employ-
ment opportunities. 33 We are more likely to meet this condition
within a small geographic area, where a resident can live in one
community and commute to work in another community. 34 Resi-
dential segregation within commuting distances allows residents
to enjoy both the gains from trade in the labor market and the
value of living in distinctive communities. The type of segrega-
tion that Walzer defends, enforced at the national level through
immigration restrictions, cuts workers off from valuable em-
ployment opportunities and sacrifices gains from trade in the
global labor market.35
To put it another- way, to ensure an efficient outcome, Tie-
bout assumes that individuals have a wide range of alternative
communities from which to choose.36 The greater the menu of
choices, the more closely individuals can match their chosen
communities to their preferences. 37 Segregation into cultural
communities at the local level is more likely to provide a diverse
tion 74 (Edinburgh 2000) (casting doubt on Walzer's claim with the observation that
"within any cosmopolitan city throughout the globe," a neighborhood will often "have a
distinct character" and "does not need border controls to do it").
33 Tiebout did not consider restrictions on mobility "due to employment opportuni-
ties." Tiebout, 64 J Polit Econ at 419 (cited in note 20). Instead, he assumed that each
person can choose where to reside without any impact on that person's income. See id.
Once individuals must trade off their preferences over jurisdictions in which to reside
against their employment opportunities, there is no longer any guarantee that voluntary
segregation will produce optimal results. See James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz,
Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J Pub Econ 25
(1972) (noting limits on Tiebout's efficiency results).
34 See David N. Hyman, Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to
Policy 606 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 4th ed 1993) (noting that the "Tiebout hypothesis"
is most likely to hold "within a constrained geographic area," where "a citizen can change
her place of residence to one in a neighboring political jurisdiction while maintaining her
employment in her old political jurisdiction").
35 See Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions
as Employment Discrimination, 78 Chi-Kent L Rev 291, 293 (2003) (arguing that immi-
gration restrictions "curtail alien access to employment opportunities" and create "a sub-
stantial barrier to the free flow of alien labor").
36 See Tiebout, 64 J Polit Econ at 419 (cited in note 20) (assuming "a large number of
communities" among which individuals may choose).
37 See id at 418 ("The greater the number of communities and the greater the vari-
ance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference
position.").
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set of options within each local labor market than segregation at
the national level. This cultural diversity within local labor mar-
kets is especially likely if residential segregation is voluntary
rather than mandated by immigration restrictions, because a
regime of free mobility would allow immigrants attracted by the
local labor market to form their own local communities. If we
instead constrain residential options through immigration re-
strictions at the national level, so that individuals live in their
own cultural communities only by forgoing valuable employment
opportunities, then we obtain residential segregation by sacrific-
ing efficiency in the labor market.
Trade in the labor market may be possible among local
communities, but even among these communities, commuting is
not costless. Nevertheless, commuting costs among local commu-
nities are generally smaller than they are among nations or
states. Thus, any significant wage inequality among local com-
munities would induce workers to commute, thereby increasing
the supply of labor where it is relatively scarce and decreasing its
supply where it is relatively abundant, which in turn would pre-
vent wages from becoming even more unequal. Therefore, there
is a limit to how much wage inequality local residential segrega-
tion would permit in a local labor market, and thus a limit to
how much such segregation would distort the local labor market
away from an efficient allocation.
A regime of free mobility would allow residential segregation
at the local level while minimizing distortions in both the global
labor market and local labor markets. Residential segregation
maintained through local immigration restrictions would mini-
mize distortions in local labor markets but could introduce dis-
tortions in the global labor market by preventing the rise of new
ethnic communities formed by new immigrant groups. To the
extent that local immigration restrictions allow a diversity of
cultural communities to flourish within local labor markets,
however, this regime can allow migration between local labor
markets while still ensuring residential segregation, thus main-
taining distinctive cultural communities at the local level while
minimizing distortions of the global labor market.
Segregation into nation-states, enforced with immigration
restrictions, on the other hand, has allowed much greater wage
inequality to persist internationally than could persist in a local
labor market. To achieve segregation into cultural communities
at the national level, we must segregate people into larger geo-
graphic units, which inhibits trade among these communities in
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the global labor market. That is, we can mandate this more
coarse segregation only by distorting the global labor market.
Thus, the type of segregation Walzer defends creates much
greater inequalities worldwide, much greater inefficiencies in the
global labor market, and much greater losses in social welfare
than local segregation would imply.
Walzer suggests that because "individual choice is most de-
pendent upon local mobility," a regime of immigration restric-
tions at the national level, with free mobility limited to the local
level, "would seem to be the preferred arrangement in a society
like our own. '38 For the worker excluded by immigration restric-
tions from valuable employment opportunities in national labor
markets, however, local mobility may be worth very little com-
pared to the gains that international migration would produce.
Immigration restrictions at the national level might "seem to be
the preferred arrangement," but only from the perspective of a
worker who already lives in a wealthy "society like our own" and
thus has little to gain from international migration. 39
B. Culture and Language in the Private Sector
Given transportation costs, employment opportunities may
influence a worker's choice of residence, even among local com-
munities. Once we introduce economic opportunities as a consid-
eration in residential choices, can we count on voluntary segrega-
tion to maintain distinctive cultural communities? If economic
opportunities lead some to migrate into communities with a cul-
ture different from the migrants' native culture, then this migra-
tion would undermine the homogeneity of the community that
becomes more diverse as a result of immigration. Insofar as resi-
dents value this homogeneity, immigration can impose costs on
that community.
Residents may prefer a monocultural community, for exam-
ple, because markets may work most efficiently with a culturally
homogeneous population. As Edward Lazear explains:
Trade between individuals is facilitated when all traders
share a common culture and language. A common culture
38 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
39 Will Kymlicka also seems to adopt the perspective of those who already enjoy im-
portant social and economic advantages when he asserts that "[m]ost people in liberal
democracies clearly favour" a world with immigration restrictions, "even if this means
they have less freedom to work and vote elsewhere." Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citi-
zenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 93 (Oxford 1995).
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allows individuals to trade with one another without in-
termediaries. In the case of language, this is most clear. If
two agents speak the same language, they can negotiate a
contract without the use of a translator. A common cul-
ture allows the traders to have common expectations and
customs, which enhances trust.40
Trade may be possible in the absence of a common culture or
language, but it would entail greater transaction costs. 41
By undermining cohesion, cultural diversity might under-
mine the efficient working of markets as well as other social and
political institutions. "The existence of more than one culture or
language imposes a cost on a society," Lazear suggests, because
"[i]n a multicultural society, individuals suffer when they cannot
deal with differently cultured individuals."42 These transaction
costs arise not only in labor markets but also in markets for
goods and services. Not only workers and employers but also
merchants and consumers may bear costs when market partici-
pants are culturally diverse.
On the other hand, because migrants would bear some of
these costs, we would expect people to anticipate them and take
them into account in deciding where to live. Given transportation
costs, people prefer to live near those with whom they expect to
trade the most: "Individuals tend to cluster with others from
their own culture," Lazear suggests, "in large part because doing
so enhances trade."43 In the United States, for example, those
"who are not fluent in English are probably more likely to move
to areas in which there are many others who speak their own
40 Edward P. Lazear, Culture and Language, 107 J Polit Econ S95, S97 (1999). See
Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity:
Evidence from U.S. Cities, 6 J Econ Geo 9, 10 (2005) (suggesting that in "a multi-cultural
environment," cultural diversity could "reduce productivity" by generating "intercultural
frictions").
41 See Lazear, 107 J Polit Econ at S98 (cited in note 40) ("In reality, trade can occur
between individuals with different cultures or languages. In the case of language, a trans-
lator can be used. In the case of culture, mistrust and misunderstandings can be avoided
by hiring individuals who are bicultural to act as liaisons. But such activity is costly
.... "); Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, Cities and Cultures, 58 J Urban
Econ 304, 305 (2005) (noting that 'linguistic diversity has a clear 'communication' cost,
due to the imperfect communication between groups"); id at 307 ("Combining workers
whose countries of origin have different cultures, legal systems, and languages imposes
costs on the firm that would not be present if all the workers had similar backgrounds.");
id at 333 (noting that "difficulties in integration and communication across different
groups... may harm aggregate productivity").
42 Lazear, 107 J Polit Econ at S113 (cited in note 40).
43 Id at S99.
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language."44 Individuals sort themselves geographically by lan-
guage "precisely because they cannot interact with others unless
they do,"45 and Lazear finds empirical evidence of this "sorting"
in 1990 census data for the United States.46 Thus, transportation
costs and the transaction costs that individuals bear in a multi-
cultural marketplace provide more reasons, in addition to het-
erogeneous preferences for local public goods, for us to expect
free mobility to lead to voluntary segregation into distinctive cul-
tural communities.
Even if purely voluntary residential choices would maintain
distinctive cultural communities, however, they would not neces-
sarily produce the socially optimal degree of segregation. If eco-
nomic incentives are great enough, then immigrants will move
into a community that does not share their culture. 47 If wages
prevailing in one community are higher than those in another,
for example, workers may choose to migrate into the community
with more lucrative employment opportunities. Migration may
allow workers to enjoy greater access to those employment op-
portunities. Reducing the distance between home and work
would reduce commuting costs.
The migration of workers would produce gains from trade in
the labor market and reduce social costs, including commuting
costs. The worker would weigh these benefits as well as the costs
of living as a member of a minority in a community in which the
majority of the residents share a culture different from the
worker's. Given that the worker will weigh these costs and bene-
fits in deciding whether to migrate, how would we expect the
worker's decision to deviate from the social optimum? What
market failure would lead residents to undermine socially opti-
mal segregation through their decentralized individual choices
regarding where to live?
One possibility is the presence of externalities from the mi-
gration of workers. If workers impose external costs on other
residents in communities to which they migrate, then we cannot
44 Id at S103.
45 Id at S104. "Ghettos ... are a natural consequence of the desire to trade," Lazear
suggests, because members of cultural minorities "can increase the probability that trade
occurs by living in areas in which they will encounter only individuals who share their
culture." Lazear, 107 J Polit Econ at S119-20 (cited in note 40). See id at S124 ("Self-
induced concentration of minority members into neighborhoods is a natural consequence
of the desire to trade.").
46 Id at S104.
47 Thus, if "a trade outside the ghetto" is "worth more than a trade inside," then a
minority member may "want to live outside the ghetto." Id at S120.
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ensure that their private choices will be socially optimal. We can
only infer that the private benefits from migration exceed the
private costs. The worker may bear only a portion of the social
cost from migration. Insofar as residents gain from living in a
monocultural community, and immigrants undermine the homo-
geneous local culture when they enter the community, this effect
on the local culture may represent a negative externality.
On the other hand, residents may also gain from living in a
more diverse community "if different cultures bring enriched
trading opportunities that would be absent in a single-culture
society."48 For example, as Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni
Peri note, "cultural diversity may increase the variety of avail-
able goods and services." 49 Given "a taste for variety," this effect
"may increase the value of total production" in the local econ-
omy.50 Furthermore, "the skills and abilities of foreign-born
workers and thinkers may complement those of native workers
and thus boost problem solving and efficiency in the work-
place."51 Indeed, "by bringing together complementary skills, dif-
ferent abilities and alternative approaches to problem solving,
diversity may [ ] boost creativity, innovation, and ultimately
growth."5 2 Thus, "complementarity between workers, in terms of
skills, can more than offset the costs of cross-cultural interac-
tion."53 In fact, Ottaviano and Peri present empirical evidence
48 Lazear, 107 J Polit Econ at S113 (cited in note 40). Lazear points to the "wide
variety of cuisines" and the "many different kinds of restaurants" in the United States as
an example of how cultural diversity produces more social value for consumers. Id. In
such a case, "the value of a trade is higher in multicultural societies than in single-
culture societies." Id.
49 Ottaviano and Peri, 58 J Urban Econ at 333 (cited in note 41).
50 Ottaviano and Peri, 6 J Econ Geo at 39 (cited in note 40). They explain that "for-
eign-born workers may provide services that are not perfectly substitutable with those of
natives." Id. See also id at 10 ("The foreign born conceivably have different sets of skills
and abilities than the US born, and therefore could serve as valuable factors in the pro-
duction of differentiated goods and services."). They suggest, for example, that "[ain Ital-
ian stylist, a Mexican cook and a Russian dancer simply provide different services that
their US-born counterparts cannot." Id at 39. "Italian restaurants, French beauty shops,
German breweries, Belgian chocolate stores, Russian ballets, Chinese markets, and In-
dian tea houses all constitute valuable consumption amenities that would be inaccessible
to Americans were it not for their foreign-born residents." Id at 10.
51 Id at 10. See id at 39 ("Even at the same level of education, problem solving, crea-
tivity and adaptability may differ between native and foreign-born workers so that recip-
rocal learning may take place.").
52 Ottaviano and Peri, 58 J Urban Econ at 305 (cited in note 41). See id at 307 (sug-
gesting that "higher diversity can lead to more innovation and creativity by increasing
the number of ways groups frame problems, thus producing a richer set of alternative
solutions and consequently better decisions").
53 Id.
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that the net effect of local cultural diversity is to increase the
productivity and wages of native workers in the United States.5 4
To the extent that the economic reward for migration inter-
nalizes these costs and benefits, the market would provide ap-
propriate incentives to the worker contemplating a move. If the
social value of trade is higher in the community receiving an
immigrant worker, for example, then this value would imply a
higher wage for the worker. Insofar as this wage reflects a higher
marginal product of labor, the immigrant would internalize this
social benefit of immigration in the form of the wage increase.
Similarly, to the extent that cultural barriers reduce opportuni-
ties for trade in the labor market or increase the costs of trade,
these would also reduce the expected wages and the economic
reward for the migrating worker.
What external cost does an immigrant worker impose on the
community that becomes more diverse as a result of the migra-
tion? In Lazear's formal model, market participants encounter
one another at random so that a multicultural community bears
an opportunity cost in the form of lost trades when individuals
from different cultures encounter one another.55 Each party
bears an opportunity cost in such an encounter, but each bears
only a portion of the total social cost. In the real world, however,
one can reduce search costs through advertisements and market-
ing directed at those workers or consumers with whom one is
most likely to trade. Nevertheless, an influx of those from an-
other culture who speak a foreign language may increase search
costs or otherwise reduce the efficiency of markets as they in-
crease the cultural diversity in the community receiving the im-
migrants.
Furthermore, Lazear defines "trade" so broadly as "to in-
clude nonmarket interaction as well."56 If we understand the so-
54 Specifically, their study of cities in the United States reveals "a significant and
robust positive correlation between cultural diversity and the wages of white US-born
workers" that is "compatible only with a dominant positive correlation between productiv-
ity and diversity," and their results from "instrumental variable estimation support[ ] the
idea of causation going from the latter to the former." Id at 333. See Ottaviano and Peri, 6
J Econ Geo at 38 (cited in note 40) (concluding that "our data support the hypothesis of a
positive productivity effect of diversity with causation running from diversity to produc-
tivity of US workers"); id at 39 (concluding that their findings "are consistent with" the
hypothesis that "a more multicultural urban environment makes US-born citizens more
productive").
55 See Lazear, 107 J Polit Econ at S97 (cited in note 40) (assuming that "an individ-
ual randomly encounters one and only one other individual in each period" and that "for
trade to occur, an individual must encounter another individual with his own culture").
56 Id.
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cial costs and benefits of cultural diversity to include its impact
on "nonmarket" encounters, including social and political inter-
actions, then economic incentives provided through markets
would not internalize these costs and benefits. Here, cultural
diversity may generate negative externalities because "heteroge-
neous preferences or distaste for different groups may decrease
utility or trigger social conflicts."57 Ottaviano and Peri also sug-
gest that "communities with a higher degree of ethnic fragmen-
tation" may be "less willing to pool their resources for public
goods provision" because "each ethnic group cares less about the
provisions granted to other ethnic groups."58 Do these various
externalities imply a systematic tendency toward excessive im-
migration of members of cultural minorities? Do they suggest the
need for immigration restrictions in order to preserve distinctive
cultural communities, where residents have "some special com-
mitment to one another and some special sense of their common
life," as Walzer puts it?59
C. Externalities
If residents enjoy any benefits or bear any costs that are a
function of the population of cultural minorities-for example,
because these minorities affect the local culture when they enter
the community-then we can translate these costs and benefits
into residents' preferences regarding the minority population.
Conversely, if residents have preferences regarding this popula-
tion for any reason, we can model these preferences as either
costs or benefits for residents that are a function of this popula-
57 Ottaviano and Peri, 58 J Urban Econ at 333 (cited in note 41). See id at 305 (noting
that "cultural diversity can generate costs from potential conflicts of preferences, hurdles
to communication, or outright racism, prejudice or fear of other groups"); Ottaviano and
Peri, 6 J Econ Geo at 10 (cited in note 40) ("[Nlatives may not enjoy living in a multi-
cultural environment if they feel that their own cultural values are being endangered.").
58 Ottaviano and Peri, 58 J Urban Econ at 331-32 (cited in note 41). In fact, their
study of cities in the United States produces empirical evidence that "racial diversity has
a negative and significant impact on public spending," but 'linguistic diversity ... has no
significant impact." Id at 332. They suggest their results reflect "the particularly disad-
vantaged and segregated position of the African American community." Id at 333.
59 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 62 (cited in note 15). "For the liberal welfare state to
enlist the active public support necessary if it is to do its ... work," Peter Schuck sug-
gests, "some such community is essential." Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Im-
migration Law, 84 Colum L Rev 1, 88 (1984). Expressing similar concerns, David Miller
argues that "states are likely to function most effectively when they embrace just a single
national community," appealing to "the political consequences of solidarity and cultural
homogeneity." David Miller, On Nationality 90 (Oxford 1995). See also id at 83-85, 93
(suggesting that multinational states find it difficult to promote "social justice" through
transfers).
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tion. Insofar as migrants do not internalize these costs or bene-
fits, these effects represent externalities generated by migration.
We can understand the classic model of residential segrega-
tion developed by Thomas Schelling as a model of migration ex-
ternalities. 60 Suppose people are divided into two different types,
and individuals have preferences regarding the composition of
the population in their local neighborhood and are free to move
to neighborhoods that are more attractive in light of these pref-
erences. Suppose also that these types represent membership in
different cultural groups. Do we expect people to hold preferences
that will generate migration that undermines socially valuable
distinctive communities?
Suppose people of each type are averse to being in the minor-
ity. That is, people enjoy a benefit from being in the majority and
bear a cost as a result of being in the minority. For example, if
each resident generates a positive externality for other residents
of the same type and a negative externality for other residents of
the opposite type, then each would prefer to be in the majority. If
the benefit of majority status is large enough, members may pre-
fer to move if necessary to ensure this status. If members of each
group insist on being in the majority in their own local communi-
ties, then only complete segregation would be an equilibrium. 61
Thus, a strong preference for being in the majority would hardly
undermine the stability of distinctive communities.
Suppose instead that each type can tolerate minority status,
but groups still place a limit on how small a minority they are
willing to be. They may even prefer to live in integrated commu-
nities rather than homogeneous communities, but their aversion
to minority status dominates once they find themselves in a suf-
ficiently small minority.62 That is, as a minority shrinks, the
costs of minority status eventually exceed the benefits that mi-
nority members derive from cultural diversity. If we start from
complete segregation, then we will remain there because no one
will be willing to move into a neighborhood so overwhelmingly
60 See Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 137-66 (Norton 1978);
Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J Math Soc 143 (1972).
61 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 141 (cited in note 60) ("[1]f each
insists on being a local majority, there is only one mixture that will satisfy them-
complete segregation."); Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 147 (cited in note 60) (same).
62 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 143 (cited in note 60) (assuming
that each type "may not mind each other's presence," and "may even prefer integration,
but may nevertheless wish to avoid minority status"); Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 148
(cited in note 60) (same).
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dominated by the other type.63 That neighborhood might even
welcome the entry of some immigrants of a different type be-
cause residents there would prefer some integration, but the pro-
spective immigrant would not take this positive externality from
immigration into account. Even if some neighborhoods begin
with some minority members, those who find themselves in mi-
norities too small to tolerate would move, and if they prefer to
move to communities where they are in the majority, then they
may increase those majorities and induce the minority there to
leave.64 Here the migration may increase segregation, which
would be a negative externality in the presence of preferences for
more integration.
Schelling extends his model to allow individuals within each
population to have varying degrees of toleration for integration
in a local neighborhood. 65 If the proportion of residents of the op-
posite type in this neighborhood exceeds a resident's "tolerance"
limit, then that resident will choose to move out of the neighbor-
hood to an alternative location.66 Schelling develops a dynamic
model of segregation and presents examples in which the result-
ing equilibrium is complete segregation, even if virtually all resi-
dents "actually prefer mixed neighborhoods." 67 Weak assump-
tions regarding preferences are sufficient to produce complete
segregation as an equilibrium: "Surprisingly, the results gener-
ated by this analysis do not depend upon ... a preference for liv-
ing separately. They do not even depend on a preference for be-
ing in the majority!"68 As long as their preference for integration
at some point is "outweighed" by their aversion to their "minority
63 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 143 (cited in note 60) ("Com-
plete segregation is then a stable equilibrium."); Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 148 (cited in
note 60) (same).
64 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 143 (cited in note 60) (noting
that "if those who leave move to where they constitute a majority, they will increase the
majority there and may cause the other" type "to evacuate"); Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at
148 (cited in note 60) (same).
65 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 155-66 (cited in note 60); Schel-
ling, 1 J Math Soc at 167-86 (cited in note 60); Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residen-
tial Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in Anthony H. Pascal, ed, Racial Discrimination
in Economic Life 157 (Lexington 1972).
66 Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 155-56 (cited in note 60); Schelling,
1 J Math Soc at 167 (cited in note 60); Schelling, Process of Residential Segregation at 160
(cited in note 65).
67 Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 165 (cited in note 60); Schelling, 1 J
Math Soc at 180 (cited in note 60).
68 Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 164 (cited in note 60); Schelling, 1 J
Math Soc at 180 (cited in note 60).
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status (or to their inadequate-majority status)," the result is the
same.
69
Schelling uses his model to explain the phenomenon of "tip-
ping," which occurs "when some recognizable minority group in a
neighborhood reaches a size that motivates the other residents to
begin leaving."70 The least tolerant members of the majority
leave first, moving to a more homogeneous neighborhood, and
the vacancies they leave behind are filled with the minority
members from the outside who are the most tolerant of living as
a minority in that neighborhood. Assuming some pressing de-
mand for housing for this minority group, the result of the depar-
tures is an increase in the minority population in the neighbor-
hood. This increase in turn causes more members of the majority
to leave as they find that the minority population now exceeds
their tolerance limits. The immigration of minority members and
the emigration of majority members impose a negative external-
ity on the remaining residents of the majority type, which trig-
gers another wave of migration. In extreme cases, the process
continues until what was once the minority type occupies the
entire neighborhood.
Thus, if it is important to people to live with a significant
number of their own type, then there will be a strong tendency
toward segregation, and complete segregation will be a stable
equilibrium. Indeed, such a segregated equilibrium could result
even if almost everyone prefers to live in more integrated
neighborhoods. In these cases, the external effects of migration
and free mobility lead to socially excessive segregation, not so-
cially excessive integration.
Schelling's results are not merely theoretical possibilities.
He begins by making plausible assumptions about people's pref-
erences and generates results that seem consistent with observed
patterns of residential segregation in the United States. 71 As
David Cutler and Edward Glaeser have observed, "[r]acial segre-
69 Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 165 (cited in note 60). See Schelling,
1 J Math Soc at 180 (cited in note 60).
70 Schelling, Process of Residential Segregation at 157 (cited in note 65). See Schel-
ling, 1 J Math Soc at 181 (cited in note 60) ("Tipping' is said to occur when a recognizable
new minority enters a neighborhood in sufficient numbers to cause the earlier residents
to begin evacuating.").
71 See W.A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Racial Segregation: A
Test of the Schelling Segregation Model, 28 Demography 1, 17 (1991) (concluding from
data on residential preferences of whites, blacks, and Hispanics that "it is unrealistic to
expect large levels of integration across neighborhoods").
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gation is the norm in urban America."72 What is striking if you
look at our metropolitan areas is not the scarcity of racially ho-
mogeneous neighborhoods but the scarcity of neighborhoods that
are close to being evenly divided between whites and racial mi-
norities.73 Indeed, it is widely assumed that the degree of resi-
dential segregation that prevails is excessive and that our goal as
a society should be to reduce this segregation, not to promote it.
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, for example, note
with disappointment that "urban America is only marginally less
segregated today than it was in the 1960s and 1970s, during the
height of racial rioting."74 They also observe that this segregation
persists despite the fact that "[n]umerous studies indicate that a
majority of both whites and blacks prefers, or at least, does not
object to, residential integration."7 5 Surveying the empirical evi-
dence, they find that "the conclusion that generally both whites
and blacks prefer to live in integrated neighborhoods is inelucta-
ble."76 Describing segregation as a "troubling" pathology, 77 Bell
and Parchomovsky formulate policy proposals designed to en-
courage more integrated neighborhoods. 78
D. What's Wrong with Free Movement?
Walzer is not blind to the possibility of distinctive local
communities formed and maintained without local migration
restrictions, but he finds that such communities are not perma-
nent enough to satisfy him. He complains: "Neighborhoods might
maintain some cohesive culture for a generation or two on a vol-
untary basis, but people would move in, people would move out;
soon the cohesion would be gone." 79 For Walzer, it seems impor-
72 David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q J Econ
827, 827 (1997). "In the average American city," Cutler and Glaeser note, "60 percent of
blacks would have to change residences to create an even distribution of the races across
neighborhoods, and the average black lives in a neighborhood that is 57 percent black."
Id.
73 See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 141 (cited in note 60) ("The
demographic map of almost any American metropolitan area suggests that it is easy to
find residential areas that are all white or nearly so ... but hard to find localities in
which neither whites nor nonwhites are more than, say, three-quarters of the total.");
Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 146 (cited in note 60) (same).
74 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 Colum L Rev
1965, 1966 (2000).
75 Id at 1986.
76 Id at 1987.
77 Id at 1975.
78 Bell and Parchomovsky, 100 Colum L Rev at 2005-18 (cited in note 74).
79 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
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tant that these communities not only remain distinct but also
persist indefinitely in the same geographic space.80 Thus, Walzer
insists that cultural communities must erect immigration barri-
ers to maintain their distinctiveness as "a stable feature of hu-
man life."8 1
If residents value the stability of their cultural community in
a particular geographic location, then why would we expect them
to move away, thereby undermining this stability and introduc-
ing instability into their own lives? After all, we would generally
expect those who are most attached to a particular place to out-
bid others for the privilege of living there. Incumbent residents
would sell their homes only if offered enough to compensate them
for the utility they derive from living in that community. If peo-
ple choose to move, then why not infer that they value greater
mobility over greater stability for their cultural community?
Walzer may defend "communal cohesion" as a moral value in
"non-utilitarian terms."8 2 Thus, Walzer may attach moral value
to "communal cohesion" even if the residents of a community
themselves do not attach value to it. Nevertheless, readers con-
cerned with social welfare may ask whether we should share
Walzer's concern. Why not allow people to form communities that
disband when residents no longer find it in their interests to live
together?
Schelling's "tipping" model may help illustrate how the dy-
namics of segregation may fail to produce socially optimal re-
sults. Minority members may migrate into communities domi-
nated by the majority in order to gain access to valuable em-
ployment opportunities or to take advantage of attractive hous-
ing. Suppose that instead of preferences for integration, the in-
cumbent residents strongly prefer that their cultural community
remain intact in that particular geographic location. Some mem-
bers of the majority, however, are either so intolerant of the mi-
nority or so drawn by economic opportunities elsewhere that they
leave despite their preference for a stable community. Their
80 Walzer stresses that "the link between people and land is a crucial feature of na-
tional identity." Id at 44. As Stephen Perry notes, however, "this response equates 'com-
munity' with 'nation,' and that simply begs the question; within North America, for ex-
ample, cultural communities tend not to be nations with a territorial base." Stephen R.
Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture in Schwartz, Justice in Immigration 94, 119
(cited in note 17). See Miller, On Nationality at 27 (cited in note 59) (defining "national
identity" as "connected to a particular territory," which is one of five elements that "serve
to distinguish nationality from other collective sources of personal identity").
81 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
82 Id at 37.
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choice may be privately optimal but socially costly, because their
departure allows the minority population to rise, which in turn
may cause more members of the majority to leave. Each member
of the majority may desire that his cultural group remain in the
majority, but each may depart when it becomes privately optimal
to do so, hoping that other members of their group will stay. The
continuation of that cultural community in that location may be
a public good for members of the majority, with each emigrating
resident hoping that those left behind will provide this public
good. Given strong economic incentives to immigrate, minorities
may eventually arrive in such numbers as to challenge the ma-
jority status of the previously dominant group. An entire cultural
group may evacuate, despite a universal preference of its mem-
bership that the community remain in place. Perhaps it is this
kind of scenario that Walzer envisions when he fears that free
mobility will threaten the stability of valuable cultural communi-
ties.
Even if the incumbent majority retains its majority status,
the influx of minorities may be unwelcome. To the extent that
incumbent residents find moving to be costly or are otherwise not
entirely free to move, the tendency toward segregation that
Schelling identifies may not produce complete segregation.8 3 If
people are attached to their current location, for example, or
need to stay close to where they work, then they might tolerate
living in a community that is more diverse than they would pre-
fer. The fact that they choose to stay does not mean that they are
content with the increasing cultural diversity in their neighbor-
hood. They may worry about the effect that the presence of mi-
norities has on the local culture. They may find that this pres-
ence imposes significant costs on them. They may be so commit-
ted to their current location, however, that they choose to bear
these costs rather than leave.8 4 "They experience a tension be-
83 Schelling presents examples in which integration is a possible equilibrium in his
dynamic model. See Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 161-62 (cited in note
60) (finding stable equilibria at mixed numbers of blacks and whites under alternative
assumptions regarding tolerance); Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 171-72 (cited in note 60)
(same). Bell and Parchomovsky stress the possibility of equilibria with integration. See
Bell and Parchomovsky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1988-93 (cited in note 74).
84 Schelling stresses that "tolerance" in any given neighborhood is "specific to this
location," so that members of the majority "who appear, in this location, to be less toler-
ant" of the minority than other members of the majority "may be merely more tolerant of
the alternative locations." Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior at 155 (cited in
note 60). See Schelling, 1 J Math Soc at 167 (cited in note 60). Thus, the "more tolerant"
member of the majority is either more tolerant of the minority or "less tolerant of mov-
ing." Schelling, Process of Residential Segregation at 183 n 2 (cited in note 65). Thus, "we
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tween love of place and the discomforts of a particular place,"
Walzer explains, so they "stay where they are and resent the for-
eigners in their own land."8 5
Here we see that the objection to free mobility is not that it
would fail to segregate residents into distinctive cultural com-
munities, but that it would fail to tie these communities perma-
nently to particular geographic locations, or that it would fail to
maintain the desired degree of ethnic purity in all communities.
If some communities are not satisfied by the degree of segrega-
tion that results from a regime of free mobility of labor, or if they
want to preserve their cultural community in its current geo-
graphic location, then neighborhoods may seek to erect local im-
migration barriers "to defend their local politics and culture
against strangers."86 Why not deem local immigration barriers to
be an appropriate response when externalities imply that free
mobility is not socially optimal? Schelling, after all, only demon-
strates that excessive segregation is likely under certain condi-
tions. With a change in the assumptions, excessive integration
may be the outcome instead. Why not allow local communities to
respond to their specific circumstances as they see fit?
Walzer warns that the result may be "a thousand petty for-
tresses" instead of "a world without walls."8 7 He concedes that
these "fortresses, too, could be torn down," but "the result would
be ... a world of radically deracinated men and women," without
the stable communal cohesion that he considers so important.88
Walzer concludes that immigration restrictions at the national
level are an appropriate response to these concerns. The alterna-
tive of segregation at the local level, however, suggests two prob-
lems with this line of reasoning. One problem is a question of
economics; the other problem is a moral question.
First, to the extent that people can segregate at the local
level into distinct communities within commuting distances, they
can reside in a cultural community that matches their prefer-
ences with minimal interference with their access to employment
opportunities. Voluntary segregation at the local level would dis-
tort the global labor market less than immigration restrictions at
the national level would. If we really believe that it is important
could as well call it 'immobility.' It is a tolerance/mobility ratio." Id.
85 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 38 (cited in note 15).
86 Id.
87 Id at 39.
8 Id.
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to preserve cultural communities in particular places and with
specific degrees of ethnic purity, and that voluntary segregation
would be inadequate for these purposes, then we could allow lo-
cal communities to raise barriers to the immigration of cultural
minorities.8 9 If we actually wanted to satisfy their segregationist
preferences, we could allow them to use zoning ordinances or re-
strictive covenants, for example, much like those used by whites
to exclude blacks in the recent history of racial segregation in the
United States.90 If we are really concerned about the adverse ef-
fects of diversity on support for the funding of public goods, in-
cluding public schools,91 then this residential segregation would
have the benefit of segregating facilities such as public schools
and allowing more homogeneous local communities to fund these
public goods separately. 92 Although a regime of de jure segrega-
tion would not ensure a diversity of cultural communities within
any given labor market, insofar as it at least allows for this pos-
sibility, it can minimize distortions in the global labor market by
allowing members of different cultural communities to gain from
trade with one another in local markets. Immigration restric-
tions at the national level, however, would prevent the entry of a
worker even if a local community would be willing to admit the
89 Tamir suggests that multinational states turn to "solutions such as local autono-
mies" or "federative or confederative arrangements," which "would then lead to a world in
which traditional nation-states wither away, surrendering ... their power to structure
cultural policies to local national communities." Tamir, Liberal Nationalism at 151 (cited
in note 28). At the same time, Tamir suggests that a national community may restrict
immigration "to preserve cultural homogeneity," but "only if it has fulfilled its global
obligation to assure equality among nations" through "efforts to improve standards of
living in poorer countries." Id at 161-62.
90 See Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem
of Fair Housing, 82 Nw U L Rev 874, 877-79 (1988) (outlining the history of the use of
zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants in the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury). As explained in Part II of this article, it is appropriate that we reject these segrega-
tionist policies in the United States as violations of our principles of liberal toleration and
equality. I will argue, however, that we should also regard our current immigration re-
strictions as violations of these same principles.
91 In their study of cities in the United States, Ottaviano and Peri find that "racial
diversity decreases expenditures in public education," but the effect of "linguistic diver-
sity ... is not significant." Ottaviano and Peri, 58 J Urban Econ at 332 (cited in note 41).
92 Compare Miller, On Nationality at 85 (cited in note 59) (suggesting that a multina-
tional state could embrace "a form of federalism, making each constituent nationality
responsible for promoting social justice within its own area through ... social insurance
or poverty relief programmes"); Chandran Kukathas, The Case for Open Immigration, in
Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, eds, Contemporary Debates in Applied
Ethics 207, 216 (Blackwell 2005) (questioning whether "the nation-state is the appropri-
ate site for the settlement of questions of distributive justice" given that the diversity that
makes "social solidarity" and distributive justice "problematic" already exists "within the
nation-state").
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worker and thus give that worker access to the local labor mar-
ket.
Given the alternative of segregation at the local level, immi-
gration at the national level seems unlikely to undermine the
ability of residents to live in a cultural community satisfying
their preferences, unless we understand those preferences to in-
clude preferences regarding the composition of the population of
the entire country, not just of their local community. Through
national immigration restrictions, residents in local communities
can influence the migration of aliens into local communities
other than their own. Insofar as local communities have hetero-
geneous preferences on these matters, however, many residents
are likely to find that immigration restrictions imposed by out-
siders to their own local community fail to satisfy local prefer-
ences, so that national immigration restrictions are likely to
prove costly. Furthermore, once we turn to preferences regarding
the cultural traits of the population on a national scale, the im-
pact of those traits on one's personal associational interests
seems far more remote and attenuated, especially in a country as
large as the United States. Not only do the social costs of immi-
gration restriction at the national level seem greater than those
of residential segregation at the local level, but the social benefit
produced by immigration restriction at the national level seems
much less weighty compared to that produced by segregation at
the local level.93
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that a nation
raising an immigration barrier will do what is socially optimal
from a global perspective. 94 A nation may well decide that its
residents attach enough value to maintaining the cultural status
quo to make it worthwhile for that nation to forego the gains
from trade that more immigration would yield. The nation's deci-
sion to restrict immigration, however, is unlikely to give equal
93 For any public policy, the more attenuated the national interest compared to local
interests, and the greater the diversity in local preferences, the stronger the case for
decentralized control over that policy. See Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 11 (Har-
court Brace Jovanovich 1972) (stating the "economic case for decentralized government"
with "variations that would ... reflect the differences in tastes for the constituencies of
the communities"); Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11
J Econ Persp 43, 43, 55 (1997) (stating the principle of "economic federalism," which pre-
fers decentralization when "spillovers" among "small jurisdictions" are "limited or ab-
sent").
94 See Chang, 145 U Pa L Rev at 1232-38 (cited in note 4) (describing the immigra-
tion policies that would maximize global economic welfare and comparing them with
those that would maximize national economic welfare).
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weight to the interests of outsiders. From the standpoint of
global economic efficiency, for example, the question for the
United States is whether those who favor our current immigra-
tion restrictions attach so much value to these restrictions, de-
spite the option of voluntary segregation at the local level, that
they would actually be willing to pay enough to compensate eve-
ryone in the world harmed by our exclusion of prospective immi-
grants. Moreover, even if our policies were to pass this test of
economic efficiency, they would not necessarily be optimal from
the standpoint of global economic welfare, assuming that our
welfare objectives also include considerations of distributive jus-
tice.
As Walzer observes: "Human beings ... move about a great
deal, but not because they love to move. They are, most of them,
inclined to stay where they are unless their life is very difficult
there."95 Given all the substantial benefits that an individual
enjoys by remaining in a community that shares that individual's
culture, no one would choose to immigrate into a community with
an alien culture unless there were something quite important to
gain. The immigrant seeks a better life, with significantly better
social and economic opportunities. Typically, the immigrant flees
poverty, having been born into disadvantaged circumstances.
Walzer is prepared to recognize "the claims of necessitous
strangers,"96 but insists that "there must be some limit" and that
communities "will still have a right" to exclude those outsiders
seeking access to the same social and economic opportunities en-
joyed by incumbent residents. 97 For Walzer, "the claims of dis-
tributive justice" do not ensure full equality of opportunity:
"Some places in the world will still be more desirable than others
.... Some places will still be uncomfortable for at least some of
their inhabitants."98 In the face of such inequality, however, why
should we satisfy the preferences of those incumbent residents
who are more advantaged at the expense of the needs of the less
advantaged who seek to immigrate?
This question brings us to the moral issue. Why should the
preferences of incumbent residents who are intolerant of cultural
diversity at the national level take precedence over the prefer-
ences of migrants for better employment opportunities? Given
95 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 38 (cited in note 15).
96 Id at 47.
97 Id at 48.
98 Id.
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the disadvantaged circumstances that many immigrants seek to
escape, considerations of distributive justice suggest that if we
should favor anyone's interests, it is the claim of the immigrant
seeking equal access to valuable economic opportunities.
II. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND LIBERAL IDEALS
To the extent that residential segregation at the local level
and equal opportunity do prove to be inconsistent, we normally
give equality priority. When it comes to racial segregation at the
local level, we condemn segregation for keeping disadvantaged
groups in an underclass cut off from valuable social and economic
opportunities.99 We hold equality of opportunity to be more im-
portant than the preferences of the privileged for their racially
homogeneous communities. Here I relax the assumption that all
preferences are equally worthy of satisfaction through public
policies and ask whether principles of liberal toleration may
place moral constraints on the objectives that a society may pur-
sue through the state and the enforcement of its laws. 100 For ex-
ample, we do not believe that the desire of residents to maintain
a white neighborhood justifies the enforcement of zoning ordi-
nances or racially restrictive covenants that exclude blacks. 10 1
We would not consider such laws or covenants any more ac-
ceptable if they excluded aliens or cultural minorities rather
99 See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1975 (cited in note
74) ("Segregation restricts employment opportunities for minorities, perpetuates educa-
tion gaps, and creates an environment congenial to crime and a host of other social pa-
thologies."); Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities at 875 (cited in note
90) (stating that "[t]he ghetto undermines much of the progress in race relations" and
"isolates many blacks from employment opportunities in the suburbs, perpetuates segre-
gation in the schools, and creates an environment where crime, gangs, drug use, and a
range of other social problems flourish"). The empirical evidence confirms that residential
segregation inflicts significant harm on blacks in the United States. See Cutler and Glae-
ser, 112 Q J Econ at 828 (cited in note 72) ("As segregation increases, blacks have lower
high school graduation rates, are more likely to be idle (neither in school nor working),
earn less income, and are more likely to become single mothers."); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt and
David L. Sjoquist, Job Accessibility and Racial Differences in Youth Employment Rates,
80 Am Econ Rev 267, 268 (1990) (concluding that the fact that black youths live further
from jobs than white youths explains between 33 percent and 54 percent of the gap in
their employment rates in the Philadelphia metropolitan area).
100 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 234-38 (Harvard 1977) (arguing
that a calculation of social welfare should exclude intolerant preferences if it is to justify a
public policy); Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility,
and the Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L J 173, 179-96 (2000) (same).
101 See Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from enforcing racially restrictive covenants); Buchanan v Warley, 245
US 60 (1917) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws that forbid blacks
to reside in white neighborhoods).
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than racial minorities from local communities. 10 2 We normally
reject associational preferences as a justification for such dis-
crimination against minorities. If we would reject such exclu-
sionary practices as violations of principles of equality and of lib-
eral toleration, then why should the same impulse to exclude be
any more legitimate when the exclusion occurs on a national
scale rather than at the local level?
Walzer warns of the "rigidities that would be forced" on "sec-
tional cultures and ethnic communities" by exclusionary prac-
tices at the local level, yet he seems complacent regarding the
"rigidities" that immigration restrictions impose at the national
level. 103 Why are these rigidities any more acceptable at the na-
tional level? Why should it be less troubling to exclude an alien
from an entire country rather than from a single neighborhood?
Expanding the geographic scope of the community from which we
exclude the alien only broadens the range of opportunities that
we thereby deny that alien. When segregation at the national
level, enforced by immigration restrictions, keeps disadvantaged
groups in conditions of poverty and cuts them off from valuable
social and economic opportunities, why should we defend this
segregation as necessary to preserve distinctive cultural commu-
nities? 104
Immigration restrictions at the national level do not seem
truly necessary to maintain distinctive cultural communities.
102 See Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 372 (1971) (declaring that "classifications
based on alienage, like those based on ... race, are inherently suspect"). Justice Black-
mun, who authored the Graham opinion, later explained that "aliens often have been the
victims of irrational discrimination" and "historically have been disabled by the prejudice
of the majority," which "led the Court to conclude that alienage classifications 'in them-
selves supply a reason to infer antipathy' .. . and therefore demand close judicial scru-
tiny." Toll v Moreno, 458 US 1, 20-21 (Blackmun concurring), (quoting Personnel Admin-
istrator v Feeney, 442 US 256, 272 (1979)). The Graham Court struck down state laws
conditioning access to welfare benefits on either U.S. citizenship or residence in the
United States for a specified number of years. Graham, 403 US at 382-83. Recognizing
the tension between the Graham reasoning and federal immigration restrictions, how-
ever, the Supreme Court would later refuse to apply the same scrutiny to federal laws
discriminating against aliens. See Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 81-87 (1976).
103 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
104 See Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Move-
ment of People on the Face of the Earth, 81 Ethics 212, 224 (1971) ("May we expect the
lesson which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities
to be repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 'de-
segregation' of nation states?"). The analogy between racial segregation and immigration
restrictions suggests that we should view the campaign for liberalized immigration poli-
cies as a natural extension of the civil rights movement. See Kevin R. Johnson and Bill
Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil
Rights Movement, 547 Harv CR-CL L Rev (forthcoming 2007).
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Voluntary segregation at both the local and national level seems
likely to ensure that such distinctive communities continue to
thrive. Instead, immigration restrictions seem designed to pre-
serve a particular cultural status quo in the countries that are
most likely to be the destination of economic migrants seeking
employment opportunities. 10 5 This objective is difficult to justify,
at least in liberal states like the United States that supposedly
seek to remain neutral among individual conceptions of the
good.106
In a society committed to liberal values, preferences for the
cultural status quo cannot justify immigration restrictions. 0 7 As
Mark Tushnet observes, "limitations on entry attempt to pre-
serve the existing distribution of values in a society, in a way
inconsistent with a liberal state's commitment to the possibility
of revising its own values as the values of its members
change.' 0 8 He concludes that "[t]here is therefore no principled
reason to object to the transformation of the polity that will occur
when those with different values enter."'0 9
Consider, for example, the infamous "national origins" quota
system that the United States used to regulate immigration from
1921 to 1965-a quota system heavily biased in favor of immi-
105 Many natives in the United States, for example, "believe immigrants are changing
American culture and values when they ought to be adopting them." Immigration: Sum-
mary of Findings, NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll 2 (Oct 2004), available at <http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/polls/2004/immigration/summary.pdf> (last visited Jan 27,
2007).
106 In a liberal state, no one can justify a legal regime by claiming that "his conception
of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens." Bruce A. Ackerman,
Social Justice in the Liberal State 11 (Yale 1980). "The public philosophy of contemporary
American politics is a version of this liberal tradition of thought," which holds that "gov-
ernment should be neutral toward the moral and religious views its citizens espouse" and
'should not affirm in law any particular vision of the good life." Michael J. Sandel, De-
mocracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 4-5 (Harvard 1996).
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a compulsory flag salute as unconstitutional,
declaring that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, relig-
ion, or other matters of opinion." West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319
US 624, 642 (1943). Mark Tushnet takes the United States to be an exemplary liberal
state, "constituted by commitments to liberal toleration." Mark Tushnet, Immigration
Policy in Liberal Political Theory in Schwartz, Justice in Immigration 147, 154 (cited in
note 17).
107 See Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican
Tradition, 85 Georgetown L J 2105, 2114-15 (1997) (detailing how liberal principles are
inconsistent with immigration restrictions).
108 Tushnet, Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory at 153 (cited in note 106).
See id at 154 ("[Value-based exclusions assume that the values constituting a polity are
fixed, yet that assumption seems unfounded and arguably inconsistent with liberalism's
basic commitments.").
109 Id at 155.
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gration from Northern and Western Europe and against immi-
gration from elsewhere. In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee
defended this system in 1950 as "a rational and logical method of
... restricting immigration in such a manner as to best preserve
the sociological and cultural balance in the population of the
United States."110 It was our recognition of the illegitimacy of our
preferences for some ethnic groups over others, however, that
motivated Congress in 1965 to eliminate this quota system. 1 ' If
cultural concerns could not justify policies so closely tailored to
maintaining the ethnic status quo, then how can they be any
more acceptable as a reason to restrict immigration generally?1 2
Walzer explains his preference for national immigration re-
strictions rather than segregation at the local level by asserting
that "[t]he politics and the culture of a modern democracy proba-
bly require the kind of largeness, and also the kind of bounded-
ness, that states provide."" 3 Even if we concede the need for
"largeness," which is certainly not obvious, we may still ask why
110 S Rep No 1515, 81st Cong, 2d Sess 455 (1950).
Ill See Nicasio Dimas, Jr., Donald Chou, and Phyllis K. Fong, The Tarnished Golden
Door: Civil Rights Issues in Immigration 11 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1980) ("The
national origins immigration quota system generated opposition from the time of its in-
ception, condemned for its attempts to maintain the existing racial composition of the
United States.").
112 Gerald Rosberg argues that the exclusion of aliens from the United States on the
basis of race or national origin should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, "because of the
injury to American citizens of the same race or national origin who are stigmatized by the
classification." Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treat-
ment by the National Government, 1977 Sup Ct Rev 275, 327. He explains that "[w]hen
Congress declares that aliens of Chinese or Irish or Polish origin are excludable on the
grounds of ancestry alone, it fixes a badge of opprobrium on citizens of the same ances-
try." Id. See Michael Blake, Discretionary Immigration, 30 Phil Topics 273, 284 (2002)
(noting that "a message that one racial group is to be preferred over another in immigra-
tion" is "a public statement" that "undermines the ability of citizens with the disfavored
racial identity to see themselves as full participants in the project of self-rule"); Kevin R.
Johnson and Bill Ong Hing, Book Review, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation:
The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 Mich L Rev 1347, 1386 (2005),
(reviewing Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National
Identity (Simon & Schuster 2004)) ("Such exclusions stigmatize and harm domestic
groups who share the same characteristics as the persons excluded."); Hiroshi Motomura,
Book Review, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94
Mich L Rev 1927, 1947-48 (1996) (reviewing Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common
Sense About America's Immigration Disaster (Random House 1995) (noting that "an im-
migration law that excludes members of a particular race or ethnic group may cast a
stigma on that group," which "violates the bedrock equal protection prohibition against
treating any person as inferior to another by virtue of race or ethnicity," and that such a
"policy may extinguish or stunt the growth of a racial or ethnic community"). Restrictions
on immigration in general, however, have the same stigmatizing effect when justified as
an indirect means of achieving the same objective: controlling the population of minority
ethnic groups.
113 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15).
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"a modern democracy" requires "boundedness" in the form of na-
tional immigration restrictions. On this question, Walzer seems
to allude to the empirical claim that "perfect mobility makes for
authoritarianism" because "authoritarian regimes" are the "sorts
of regimes" that "thrive in the absence of communal cohesion." 114
But if the claim is that a democracy requires the cohesion that
comes from cultural homogeneity, then as Stephen Perry notes,
this suggestion "is, empirically, an implausible claim."115 Perry
observes that "there are enough examples of liberal, well-
governed, and relatively harmonious multicultural states to
make it difficult to maintain that cultural homogeneity is a pre-
requisite for either political stability or the preservation of lib-
era]Idemocratic institutions."'116
Indeed, as Perry notes, the "entrenchment of a particular
culture within the political framework of a state," if pursued
114 Id at 38. Similarly Peter Schuck worries that high levels of immigration may bring
"social and cultural fragmentation, intergroup hostility, distributional inequities, and
intensified political conflict," which "will at some point degrade the quality of American
democracy." Schuck, 84 Colum L Rev at 89 (cited in note 59). He argues that "the tension
between liberalism's universal aspirations and our need as a society to achieve the degree
of solidarity that effective activist government requires must be resolved at some level of
exclusion," but he adds that "it remains unclear what this level should be." Id. Why not
prefer local immigration restrictions over national immigration restrictions? Perhaps
Walzer worries that the "rigidities" generated by local immigration restrictions would
prove fatal to the cohesion necessary for a harmonious democratic state at the national
level. Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39 (cited in note 15). Even if the only alternative to
national immigration restrictions were local immigration restrictions, however, we might
ask whether closed nation-states would produce greater harmony than that alternative.
Citing the role of nation-states in "generating vicious wars, politically sponsored attempts
at genocide, and economically damaging trade wars," Jean Hampton asks what is gained
when "groups, which had previously sought to damage one another inside a state, now do
it in wars between states." Jean Hampton, Immigration, Identity, and Justice, in
Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigration 67, 86 (cited in note 17). Similarly, if we restrict
immigration to maintain the homogeneity deemed necessary to sustain redistribution and
the provision of public goods within states, then we simultaneously segregate states along
lines that undermine global distributive justice and the provision of international public
goods. See Kukathas, The Case for Open Immigration at 217 (cited in note 92) (noting
that "[i]f the price of social justice is exclusion of the worst-off from the lands that offer
the greatest opportunity, this may be a mark against the ideal of social justice" that some
seek to defend through immigration restrictions).
115 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 113 (cited in note 80). See Tamir,
Liberal Nationalism at 163 (cited in note 28) (noting "several widely held fallacies," in-
cluding the claims "that free institutions can only operate within a homogeneous nation-
state ... and that economic development and modernization require cultural homogeniza-
tion").
116 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 113 (cited in note 80). See Miller, On
Nationality at 94-96, 98 (cited in note 59) (citing Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland as
successful multicultural democracies with effective systems of public welfare). 'The true
nation-state, in which a homogeneous cultural community coincides fairly closely with the
associated political community," Perry notes, "is the exception rather than the rule in the
modern world." Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 113 (cited in note 80).
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"simply to serve and protect the shared culture," would itself be
"contrary to liberal thought."'117 Nevertheless, Perry identifies
two concerns regarding the cultural effects of immigration that
suggest reasons for a liberal state to restrict immigration. Each
concern, however, provides only a limited justification for immi-
gration restrictions.
First, Perry notes that "a liberal state is presumably not
bound to take in a large number of persons from groups espous-
ing illiberal or undemocratic principles who might, if admitted on
a sufficiently large scale, pose a real risk to the existence or
character of a liberal democracy."118 This observation, however,
fails to justify the restrictions we currently impose on immigra-
tion. As Perry suggests, "it would presumably take a manyfold
increase in the levels of immigration to, say, the United States or
Canada before such a risk could be regarded as anything more
than a theoretical possibility."'" 9
Indeed, insofar as those who choose to migrate to liberal de-
mocratic states do so because they appreciate the benefits of liv-
ing in a liberal democracy, these immigrants will not be inclined
to change existing institutions in the host country. 120 Immi-
grants, perhaps more than natives, appreciate the value of these
institutions in their host countries, because they can compare
these institutions with those that have produced the conditions
that they are fleeing in their countries of origin. 12' This self-
selection process reduces the threat that any given level of immi-
117 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 111 (cited in note 80).
118 Id at 114. See also Carens, 49 Rev Pol at 262 (cited in note 18) (arguing that "the
effect of immigration on the particular culture and history of the society would not be a
relevant moral consideration, so long as there was no threat to basic liberal democratic
values'); Tushnet, Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory at 157 n 25 (cited in
note 106) (adding "the qualification that the community must satisfy minimum norms of
political justice-the 'no tyranny' requirement" to the principle of liberal neutrality).
Similarly, Bruce Ackerman concludes that the only legitimate reason for a liberal state to
restrict immigration is to protect the liberal state itself. See Ackerman, Social Justice in
the Liberal State at 95 (cited in note 106) ('The only reason for restricting immigration is
to protect the ongoing process of liberal conversation itself. Can our present immigration
practices be rationalized on this ground?").
119 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 114 (cited in note 80).
120 See Johnson and Hing, 103 Mich L Rev at 1352 (cited in note 112) (noting that
"most immigrants come to the United States because they embrace American political
values and economic freedoms").
121 See Peter H. Schuck, Book Review, Alien Rumination, 105 Yale L J 1963, 1996 and
n 176 (1996), (reviewing Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's
Immigration Disaster (Random House 1995) (noting that "most of those who have chosen
America presumably identify at least as strongly with its ideals and institutions as those
who just happened to be born here" and that "many... are refugees fleeing cruel regimes
in harsh societies").
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gration may pose to the character of our liberal democracy. Fur-
thermore, immigrants exposed to liberal democratic values in the
host country will tend to absorb these values, especially as ad-
vances in telecommunication technologies increasingly spread
these values around the globe to reach many prospective mi-
grants in countries of emigration before they migrate. 122
Second, Perry notes that "a certain degree of cultural stabil-
ity and cohesiveness is necessary to preserve either general so-
cial and political stability or the liberal/democratic character of
existing political institutions," and therefore "immigration may
be restricted accordingly."'123 Here, however, "the core issue" is
"the rate of cultural change, not the preservation of an existing
culture or cultural mix. ' 124 Thus, a liberal state may impose im-
migration restrictions "to ensure that cultural change within the
state is not too rapid and present social forms are not simply
overwhelmed," but may not otherwise seek to prevent cultural
change. 125
This second rationale for immigration restrictions, based on
"a demand for cultural continuity," seems especially limited once
we recognize that "the character and the extent of the restric-
tions that might be necessary to maintain cultural and social
stability" will depend on "a variety of factors, including ... cur-
rent cultural makeup" and "the existing degree of cultural het-
erogeneity."'126 As immigrants from foreign cultures enter, they
122 See Johnson and Hing, 103 Mich L Rev at 1380 (cited in note 112) ("Even before
coming to the United States, immigrants have been exposed to American culture due to
its pervasiveness in the global media.").
123 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 113-14 (cited in note 80).
124 Id at 114. See id ("What is at stake is cultural continuity rather than the substance
of the dominant culture or cultures."). See also Miller, On Nationality at 128 (cited in note
59) ("Why should immigrants pose a threat to national identity once it is recognized that
that identity is always in flux, and is moulded by various sub-cultures that exist within
the national society?"); Kukathas, The Case for Open Immigration at 215 (cited in note
92) (noting that "many societies have experienced significant cultural or social transfor-
mations and not only survived but prospered").
125 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 114 (cited in note 80). Similarly,
Carens concedes that "public order" may require "some restrictions on immigration," but
notes that "the need for some restriction would not justify any level of restriction whatso-
ever or restrictions for other reasons, but only that level of restriction essential to main-
tain public order." Carens, 49 Rev Pol at 260 (cited in note 18). He also stresses that a
"hypothetical possibility of a threat to public order is not enough." Id at 259. These con-
siderations "would surely imply a much less restrictive policy than the one currently in
force which is shaped by so many other considerations besides the need to maintain pub-
lic order." Id at 260.
126 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 114-15 (cited in note 80). This cultural
continuity may be important not only for "liberal and/or democratic institutions" but also
for "the individual well-being of current citizens." Id at 112. Will Kymlicka, for example,
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will change the "cultural makeup" of the country of immigration
by making its society more multicultural. As this society becomes
more diverse, more immigrants from those cultures would pose
less of a threat to cultural continuity and social stability, eventu-
ally allowing still higher levels of immigration. Ultimately, im-
migration policies may be liberal enough to allow the global labor
market to reach an equilibrium in which the free movement of
workers would no longer pose a threat to social stability. After
all, the prospect of free movement may seem threatening under
current circumstances only because we assume that existing
immigration restrictions have distorted the global labor market
so far from equilibrium that the elimination of these barriers
would unleash a flood of migrants. 127 If immigration polices were
liberalized enough to allow the global labor market to equili-
argues that "cultural structure" is important because it provides a person with "a context
of choice." Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture 167 (Oxford 1989). He
claims that "some limits on immigration can be justified if we recognize that liberal states
exist, not only to protect standard rights and opportunities of individuals, but also to
protect people's cultural membership." Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship at 125 (cited
in note 39).
127 See Ana Maria Iregui, Efficiency Gains from the Elimination of Global Restrictions
on Labour Mobility: An Analysis Using a Multiregional CGE Model, in George J. Borjas
and Jeff Crisp, eds, Poverty, International Migration and Asylum 211, 224 (2004) (esti-
mating that about half of the workers in developing countries would have to migrate in
order to eliminate international wage inequalities); Jonathon W. Moses and Bjorn Letnes,
If People Were Money: Estimating the Gains and Scope of Free Migration, in George J.
Borjas and Jeff Crisp, eds, Poverty, International Migration and Asylum 188, 197-98
(estimating that more than two-thirds of the population in developing countries would
have to migrate in order to eliminate international wage inequalities). It is not clear,
however, how many workers would actually choose to migrate if allowed to do so freely.
See Phillippe Legrain, Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them 327-28 (Little, Brown
2006) (reporting that after the United Kingdom opened its borders to workers from East-
ern Europe, little net migration followed, despite wages in Britain five times higher than
those in Poland); Johnson, 51 UCLA L Rev at 253 (cited in note 9) (suggesting that it is
"far from evident" that "open borders" would lead to "a drastic increase in immigration").
A "general affinity for family and homeland" and "human inertia" tend to inhibit migra-
tion even in the face of substantial economic incentives. Id at 202. Ethnocentric or na-
tionalistic biases may lead us to overestimate the number of aliens who would immigrate
if given the opportunity to do so legally. See id at 201 (suggesting that fears "that millions
of immigrants from around the world will overwhelm the United States" if we were to
open our borders "betray an attitude of U.S. superiority" in assuming that people around
the world "could not resist coming to the best of all countries if the opportunity existed").
We would expect the costs of migration to imply less immigration than would occur under
complete convergence in wages. See Iregui, Efficiency Gains from the Elimination of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility at 226-27 (estimating that for wages in develop-
ing countries to reach 70 or 90 percent of wages in the developed countries, as little as 23
or 30 percent of the labor force in developing countries would have to migrate). Jonathon
Moses and Bjorn Letnes, however, estimate that for international wage differences to fall
by 30 percent, more than a billion people would have to migrate. See Moses and Letnes, If
People Were Money at 198 (cited in note 127). While this flow would be less than a third of
the population of the source countries, this scenario would still imply that immigrants
would outnumber natives in developed countries. See id.
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brate, then there would no longer be any pent-up demand for
immigration for us to fear. Thus, the immigration restrictions
that can be justified by the need for cultural continuity seem
likely to be temporary, in place only to ensure an orderly transi-
tion from the status quo to a regime of generally free labor mobil-
ity.
Both the justification based on social stability and the justi-
fication based on the preservation of a liberal democracy, how-
ever, may be abused to rationalize excessively restrictive and
intolerant immigration policies. Given the ugly role that racism
and xenophobia have played in the formulation of immigration
policies in the past, we should be reluctant to endorse these cul-
tural concerns as a justification for our immigration restrictions
today. 128 Our analysis of the cultural effects of immigration, even
if conducted in good faith, seems likely to be tainted by a bias
against foreigners. 129
128 See Carens, 49 Rev Pol at 260 (cited in note 18) (noting that such "arguments were
used in the nineteenth century against Catholics and Jews from Europe and against all
Asians and Africans" and suggesting that "we should be wary of resurrecting them");
Tushnet, Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory at 150 (cited in note 106) ("A
more realistic view, informed by the history of immigration policy, would be more skepti-
cal .... Rather than admirable efforts to ... preserve morally valuable communities,
present immigration practices seem racist and ethnocentric."). Michael Trebilcock criti-
cizes Walzer's justification for immigration restrictions "on grounds of preserving cultural
homogeneity--'they are not like us,"' noting that "[t]his form of communitarianism has
been invoked in the past to justify some of the most egregious forms of racial and reli-
gious discrimination in the history of Canada and the United States." Michael J. Trebil-
cock, The Case for a Liberal Immigration Policy, in Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigration
219, 240 (cited in note 17). See Tushnet, Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory at
157 n 20 (cited in note 106) ("mhe value-based exclusion might serve as a mask for a
race-based exclusion: we might say that some people are 'not like us' because of their
values when we really believe that they are 'not like us' because of their race."); Dimas,
Chou, and Fong, Tarnished Golden Door at 7-12 (cited in note 111) (reviewing the history
of discrimination in US immigration policies).
129 Jody Armour notes that "[t]he tendency of individuals to credit only those statistics
and images which confirm their preexisting biases exacerbates [ ] irrational influences"
such as "cultural stereotypes" and "racial antagonisms." Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Lo-
quitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46
Stan L Rev 781, 791 (1994). Thus, Armour worries that "factfinders will inevitably exag-
gerate the weight properly accorded" to facts that are consistent with these prior biases.
Id. Prejudice against foreigners is widespread enough to raise doubts about claims of
adverse effects of immigration on the national culture. See, for example, Peter Brimelow,
Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster 178-81 (Random
House 1995) (raising concerns about the cultural consequences of immigration, the cul-
tural traits of immigrant groups, and the implications of those traits for economic suc-
cess); id at 59-73 (describing white America as caught between the "pincers" of Hispanic
and Asian immigration). We should instead take care to give due weight to evidence of
the positive contributions that immigrants make to our culture. See, for example, Schuck,
105 Yale L J at 2012 (cited in note 121) (concluding that "America desperately needs what
so many immigrants possess-optimism and energy, orientation to the future, faith in
education as the ladder upward, hunger for their own and their children's success, and
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It is telling that we ordinarily reject the risk of social strife
and instability as a justification for compulsory residential seg-
regation in the domestic context. 130 We refuse to allow intolerant
residents to dictate public policies through the threat of social
strife; we instead seek to promote liberal toleration. In setting
immigration policies, a liberal state should similarly refuse to
accept or to legitimize intolerance as part of "the social status
quo" and instead seek "to encourage ... the development of more
tolerant public attitudes."131
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the justifications for immigration restric-
tions based on cultural effects are more limited than commonly
supposed. Immigration restrictions at the national level do not
seem truly necessary to maintain distinctive cultural communi-
ties. Voluntary segregation at both the local and national level
seems likely to ensure that such distinctive communities con-
tinue to thrive while also allowing members of different commu-
nities to enjoy gains from trade in the labor market. Instead, na-
tional immigration restrictions seem to reflect the preferences of
incumbent residents for the cultural status quo in their coun-
tries. It seems doubtful that such preferences can justify existing
immigration restrictions as policies maximizing global economic
welfare, at least in the face of significant inequalities in economic
opportunity that give migrants an important interest in access to
labor markets in countries of immigration.
The preferences of incumbent residents who are intolerant of
foreign cultures are especially unlikely to justify existing immi-
gration restrictions in societies like our own that are committed
devotion to a dynamic, hopeful vision of America that has lost focus for many native-born
citizens").
130 In Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60 (1917), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
law forbidding blacks to occupy homes in white neighborhoods, rejecting the justification
"that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race con-
flicts." Id at 81. Similarly, in Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that a state cannot deny a divorced mother custody of her child on the basis of her
interracial remarriage, even if the persistence of racial prejudice in society implies that "a
child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures
and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic
origin." Id at 433. The court stressed: "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id.
131 Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture at 115 (cited in note 80). See Johnson, 51
UCLA L Rev at 252 (cited in note 9) (suggesting that "we should strive to welcome and
accept people of different cultures and backgrounds and races, not keep them out because
some segments of our society might act in discriminatory ways").
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to liberal principles. It is telling that we normally reject intoler-
ant preferences as justifications for public policies mandating
residential segregation at the local level. Instead, we choose to
give equality of opportunity priority over the preferences of in-
cumbent residents for the status quo in their communities. A
liberal society should give equality the same priority when it
comes to the question of immigration restrictions.
This suggestion does not imply that liberal states must
throw open their borders overnight. There may well be other rea-
sons, such as concerns for social stability and for the preserva-
tion of liberal democratic institutions, to maintain some immi-
gration restrictions under current circumstances and in the near
future. I do mean to suggest, however, that liberal states should
seek to liberalize their immigration policies, thereby reducing
global inequalities in economic opportunity, and that these states
should continue to liberalize their restrictions over time unless
further liberalization would pose risks substantial enough to
outweigh the interests of migrants in equal access to economic
and social opportunities. 132 It is incumbent upon liberal states to
pursue such reforms if they are to remain faithful to the egalitar-
ian ideals that they espouse.
132 The immigration bill debated by the Senate in 2006 would have liberalized the
ceiling on the number of guest-worker visas annually in response to excess demand for
those visas. See Senate.Resumes Comprehensive Immigration Reform Debate, 83 Inter-
preter Releases 981-82 (2006) (describing the amendments adopted during Senate debate
to an immigration reform bill in May of 2006). Before passing that bill, however, the
Senate amended the bill to fix that ceiling at 200,000 per year. See id at 981.
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